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I . INTRODUCTION
The Defense Communications Agency ( DCA ) is continuing
its direction of research in Command? Control and
Communications ( C3 ) with another in a series of
experiments using the Headquarters Effectiveness
Assessment Tool (HEAT). The vehicle for this experiment
was the Joint Theater Level Simulation ( JTLS ) . Previous
research in this area has included the evaluation of
Operations Plans using various wargaming systems including
JTLS and an assessment of HEAT to quantify the command and
control system effectiveness of simulated headquarters.
This thesis will review the background of these systems and
the vehicle for the present experiment and discuss the
particular uniqueness of this experiment.
A. DCA/HEAT BACKGROUND
The Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT)
development project was a.r\ initiative of the C3
Architecture and Mission Analysis in the Planning and
Systems Integration Directorate of the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA). The Defense Nuclear Agency
supported the project due to the interest in the survival
of an effective C3I system during nuclear combat. The
goal was to size thea ter - 1 eve 1 headquarters and make them
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survivable and effective. ( Ref . 1, p. 39) The problem of
determining what was effective had to be solved first.
(Ref. 2, pp. pl-p3) The strategy was to first develop a
method to recognize the difference between effective and
ineffective headquarters performance, then find factors
that could be used to explain, predict and eventually
manipulate the level of performance. Defense Systems,
Incorporated of McLean, Virginia was awarded the
development contract and tasked with an initial goal of
developing a methodology for measuring the effectiveness of
theater level headquarters. (Ref. 1, pp. 39-'^0 ) Effective
headquarters performance is strongly influenced by
intangible qualities such a leadership, staff, commander
instinct, morale and willpower. Even if a headquarters is
structurally sound, it may not be effective just as the
best commander and staff cannot make a structurally
inadequate headquarters perform effectively. (Ref. 2, pp.
pl-p3) One of the intended uses of HEAT was to be a tool
that the commander would use to structure the headquarters
configuration to provide the capabilities necessary to meet
the military mission. (Ref. 3, pp. 1-9)
HEAT is Ar\ analysis tool that was designed to allow &v\
objective and quantitative assessment of theater level
headquarters performance and effectiveness by a team of
internal or external observers. HEAT was to provide
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quantitative, objective, and reproducible numerical scores
which would be descriptive of the effectiveness of the
headquarters command organization. HEAT is designed for
application to those headquarters organizations that ^re
primarily responsible for the planning, supporting and
coordination of fighting forces, not direct \A)ar fighting.
(Ref . 2, pp . 1.1-1.2)
The commands that were referred to as "theater
headquarters" during the HEAT development were the highest
levels of the U.S. and NATO commands. The development team
established the definition of a theater command to be the
highest level of military command in a distinct geographic
region, where the overall commander of military force is
the theater commander. (Ref. 2, p. 2.10)
The development team had to determine what functions
and roles that a theater command performed before they
could measure its performance and effectiveness. The
study of headquarters organization found that the theater
commander's role had evolved from the battlefield
commander toward the present day role as a planner and
logistician. The theater command today is a layered
structure with direct control of fighting forces handled
at corps, fleet and major air command levels. The
commander provides support for his subordinate commanders.
He performs an interface function for the translation of
political, economic and social guidance into military
directives. The higher the command, the greater the
interface function performed. ( Ref . 1, pp. ^1-^2.) The
principal role of the theater commander is the assignment
of military objectives and resources to his war fighting
commands. (Ref. 2, pp. 2.11-2.15) The vehicle for
assigning objectives and resources is via the military
directive, the plan and it is a measurable entity. (Ref.
2, pp. 2.32-2.33)
The JCS Publication I definition of a Command and
Control system is:
"The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures,
and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces
pursuant to the mission assigned."
The HEAT development team expanded the definition and
defined a theater level headquarters to be:
"The set of personnel, equipment, communications
facilities, and procedures for the execution of those
command and control functions by which the commander
plans for, directs, coordinates, and controls forces and
operations pursuant to the missions assigned."
Ihis definition included communications, computer
equipment, and facilities that ars within the physical
space occupied by the headquarters personnel. Remote
elements of the headquarters are also included that are
linked directly to the headquarters via telephone,
microwave, etc., and performs an internal function or
process of the headquarters, regardless of the distance.
(Ref. 2, p. 2.7)
The key concepts concerning headquarters effectiveness
(Ref. ^, p. 1.5) that were formalized during the
development of HEAT were:
- Effectiveness is the capacity to accomplish military
miss ions
.
- Effectiveness of a theater level headquarters is its
capacity to operate as an adaptive control system such
that it keeps crucial factors in its environment (enemy
actions, losses of territory, casualties, etc.) within
expected boundaries.
- The primary measure of effectiveness is the capacity of
the headquarters to develop plans and use the
resources available to bring those plans to fruition.
- Uhen plans being used are not working, the effective
headquarters is the one that can recognize that fact,
develop alternative plans, and implement them in a
timely fashion. The effective use of contingent
options is an important issue, because of the
uncertainty inherent in military operations.
- Effectiveness is always measured in terms of
interactions with the environment.
- Timeliness, not speed, is essential for effectiveness.
- Speed and good quality decision making processes may be
necessary conditions for successful performance, but
they a.re not sufficient for success.
An effective headquarters is one that can survive,
continue to perform its assigned mission, make its
presence felt in its environment, that is, effectively
produce the desired military impact, and efficiently use
its time and resources. The concept of effectiveness is
the ability to accomplish a military mission and is
uncompromising. A headquarters may be large, complex and
functionally divided into parts; some parts may work well,
other parts may fail and the mission can still be
accomplished. In some headquarters all of the functions
may work well, as planned and the mission fails. Then the
headquarters is MOT effective. (Ref. 2, pp. 2.20-2.22)
HEAT'S purpose is to enable a team of internal or
external observers to objectively assess and quantify
headquarters performance and effectiveness. It was
developed to provide quantitative, objective, and
reproducible scores which would, in essence, be
descriptive of the effectiveness of virtually any
headquarters or command, control, communications and
intelligence system. (Ref. 5, p. 1)
For greater detail, refer to the manuals on the
Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool prepared by
Defense Systems, Incorporated, References 2 and 5.
B. JILS BACKGROUND
From November 19S0 through July 1982, a number of
tests, exercises, studies and demonstrations were
conducted using an enhanced version of the McClintic
Iheater Model ( MTM ) . As a result of these efforts, the
need for a new model with integrated Air, Land and Naval
interactions was highlighted. The United States Readiness
Command ( REDCOM ) , in conjunction with the United States
Army War College ( USAWC ) and the United States Army
Concepts Analysis Agency ( CAA ) , undertook the task of
developing the Joint Theater Level Simulation ( JTLS ) . The
Jet Propulsion Laboratory ( JPL ) > under the management and
direction of REDCOM, was tasked with the initial
development effort on JTLS.
The JTLS development effort was designed to meet three
primary objectives:
(1) Provide a contingency planning analysis tool for
REDCOM
(2) Provide an educational wargame capability for
students at the USAWC and an analytic capability for
the evaluation of doctrine for Echelon Above Corps
(EAC)
(3) Provide an analytic tool aiding contingency plan
evaluation for CAA
To meet these objectives, five specific design goals
were established for the initial development effort:
(1) Develop a tool that can be used for warfare
training, combat analysis, joint operational
planning, and doctrinal analysis.
(E) Provide functional visibility in order to facilitate
fflo del validation.
(3) Incorporate specific user requirements.
(^) Provide an enhanced user-machine interface.
(5) Provide a baseline system that can be expanded to a
graphics-assisted planning and analysis model.
In July 198S, General Vessey , as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, identified the need to upgrade the
analytic tools available to the unified Commanders-in-Chief
(CINC's) for use in \^a.r planning. As a result of his
concern, the Joint Analysis Directorate (JAD) of the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) was
tasked to begin formulating a program designed to address
this deficiency. On 15 July 1985, the Modern Aids to
Planning Program ( MAPP ) became an approved JCS program.
The JTLS model was selected as one of the models to be
included in the MAPP set of analytic models. Following the
selection of JTLS, responsibility of future JTLS
development was transferred to JAD at the completion of
version 1.5. ( Ref . 6, pp. 1.1-1.3)
C. MOTIVATION FOR 1987 NPS EXPERIMENT
The master plan of the experiment called for the
experiment to be conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School using the JTLS for HEAT. The need was for a series
of basic experiments on C3 theory and architecture
identifying the dependent and independent variables for
each experiment. This last part presented the very
unigueness this experiment held over past work conducted
at the Postgraduate School or anywhere else. Previous
work consisted of running one "wargame" experiment and
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analyzing several predetermined measures of effectiveness
(MQE). This would produce some evaluation of the
headquarters effectiveness. This experiment analyzed
several HEAT MOE ' s over a series of varying experiments to
evaluate certain prescribed hypothesis. The repetitive use
of a warqame for headquarters evaluation was a new
direction in analyzing a C3 system. Dependent upon merits
of several experiment sets conducted at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the further use of this scenario as
depicted on JTLS for future command and control
experimentation and demonstration would be determined. A
subgoal was the successful establishment of a baseline
scenario available to corresponding researchers in the
field.
I I . EXPERINEMTftL DESIGN
A National Defense University ( NDU ) workshop on
"Issues in CINC Command and Control" was developed for
presentation to a practice work group of NDU students,
then work groups of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and staff
personnel of U.S. Central Command. The purpose of the
workshop was to achieve better understanding of the issues
faced by multiservice/multinational commanders in the field
of command and control. The think piece used as the key
feature of the workshops to focus attention on issues of
L I NC command and control was the same as that used for the
basis of the JTLS experiment. ( Ref . 7, p. 1)
A, SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
The basic description was the situation of the "U.S.
Indian Ucean Command"— a fictitious yet plausible unified
Commander-in-Chief (CINC) with assigned forces and a.rea of
operations which resembles those of the Central Command
(CENTCQM) and the actions which the CINC and his staff and
commanders decide to take with respect to the command and
control systems of the command's forces top to bottom and
throughout the force. The setting and scenario of this
experiment have been adapted from material which has been
used for unclassified instruction in Service colleges. The
10
hypothetical CINC's situation and force employment should
not be construed as reflecting any operational plans or the
specific thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any
unified command.
1 . The Fictional Indian Ocean Command (INDCON)
About 1988, the U.S. Department of Defense
established a new unified command known as the U.S. Indian
Ocean Command (USINDCOM).
Headquarters, USINDCOM, is on United States
territory. An advance headquarters element is at Diego
Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. A small communications staff
is embarked on the command ship USS LASALLE , afloat in the







INDCOM's U.S. Army component (ARIND) is XXth Army,
with two corps, each with three divisions and corps
troops, and with army troops including an army suppoi'
t
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command. Its U.S. Air Force component (AFIND) is YYth Air
Force, with six tactical fighter wings, a reconnaissance
wing, an airlift wing, and other units. The forces of both
ARIND and AFIND are all based in the United States and Are
assigned full time under INDCDM operational command.
INDCDM's U.S. Navy component (NAVIND) day-to-day
consists only of a squadron in the Persian Gulf. Z2th
Fleet and its naval forces are assigned, primarily from
U.S. Pacific Command ( PACOM ) , when required. ZZth Fleet
is expected to include amphibious forces from U.S.
Atlantic Command ( LANTCDM )
.
2 . CINCIND's Initiatives in Command and Control
The establishment of USINDCOM came as the
Department of Defense and its components were adjusting to
the implications of the Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1 9S6 . That act increased the
responsibility and authority of the Chairman, JCS ; it
created the position of Vice Chairman, JCS; it increased
the role and independence of the Joint Staff by making it
responsible directly to the Chairman; and it substantially
increased the role and authority of unified command CINC's.
Shortly after taking command of USINDCOM, CINCIMD
concluded that one of his highest priority requirements
was to insure an adequate command and control system for
his forces in operations.
12
The chief of staff decided that in order to
examine command and control system readiness top to bottom
and throughout the force he needed a lifelike scenario for
a typically demanding employment of INDCOM forces in an
operational situation. It was necessary that the scenario
be unclassified so that he could get the best effort of
outsiders under the restrictions of JCS MOP 39.
3. CINCIND's "C5 Systems Research Scenario"
As a vehicle to assist their investigation and
analysis of the command and control systems of INDCOM's
forces when deployed and operating, top to bottom and
throughout the force, under the lifelike conditions of
combat, the INDCOM staff, working with the Joint Staff and
INDCGM subordinate commands, developed a scenario.
The scenario was prepared to resemble a plausible
INDCOM employment. It was designed as a means through
which detailed investigation and analysis of command and
control system performance could be conducted within the
constraints of MOP 39. The forces and their employment





The scenario laid out a hypothetical
dep 1 oyment /emp 1 oyment of a sizeable all-Service force in a
situation which CINCIND and his staff considered
13
reasonably true-to-life for the purpose intended— i.e., the
investigation of command and control system performance.
It included a complete layout of the notional
force in its operational setting, with deployment,
mission, concept of operations, follow-on forces and
logistics. It described the C2 systems of the force in
detail, assuming the time to be 1992-1993 and current
joint, Service, and national C2 system programs have been
car r i ed out
.
The scenario also laid out an assumed 1992
opposing force
—
with its composition, deployment, mission,
concept of operation, and logistics—and its notional
capabilities both for command and control and for counter-
C2.
^ . The Scenario Outline
The Scenario, in outline, is as follows (all dates






Crisis in the Mideast and
Southwest Asia; civil war
in Iran; some INDCOM
deployments; positioning of
air and sea lift
1 May to
3 June
( D-35 to D-1
)
Crisis deepens; deployment





3i May ( D-^
)
INDCOM receives order to
protect Bandar Abbas and
the Persian Gulf
^ June (D-day) INDCDM forces seize Bandar
Abbas
5 June (D+1) Soviet forces move into
Iran from Afghanistan
5 June to (D+1 to D+10) Air warfare; air
\<->t June interdiction; some naval
action; INDCOM develops its
lodgment; Soviets drive
toward Bandar-Abbas
15-16 June (D+11 &. 12) The battle of Bam (Vignette
One)
21 June (D+16) Soviets invade Azerbaijan




2*^-26 June (D +21-22) Delaying actions in
northwest Iran (Vignette
Two )
27 June to ( D+23 to D+57 ) Soviets attack toward




clash in Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean; INDCOM builds
a one corps force vicinity
Khoramabad and another at
Bandar Abbas, and a MAP at
Chah Bahar
1 Aug to (D+58 to D+77 ) The battle for southern
20 Aug Iran and the Persian Gulf
(Vignette Three)
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5. Events of Early 1992
Any scenario's "road to war" is an exercise of the
i mag i na t ion
.
In April, 1992, the ^7th Air Assault Division,
complete, is in Egypt on a scheduled exercise similar to
the CENTCOM Bright Star exercises of the 19a0s.
In April, 1992, civil ^ar breaks out in Iran,
rebel Iranian armed forces a.re supported by the Soviet
Union. On 1 May the rebels threaten to close the Strait
of Hormuz. The Government of Iran calls on the United
States and other for help. Hardliner hawk types are in
control in the Kremlin.
On ^ Nay, the U.S. begins deployment of air, land,
and sea forces into Egypt, Oman, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.
On 10 May, the JCS issues a warning order to
CINCIND and other commands, in anticipation of operations
in defense of the Strait of Hormuz. CINCIND and his staff
are at Abu Dhabi.
By late May, tensions have increased. The USSR
has taken an implacable position. Attempts by the United
Nations and other diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis
have failed. Soviet forces ar& poised to invade Iran and
to support rebel Iranian forces in the seizure of Bandar
Abbas. War seems imminent.
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On 31 May, as a pre-emptive move, the President
orders CINCIND, in conjunction with Loyalist Iranian Armed
Forces (LIAF), to secure Bandar Abbas and protect the
Strait of Hormuz
.
On 1 June the JCS defined to CINCIND the rules of
engagement
:
"No air or ground action on or over Soviet territory,
except reconnaissance missions as approved by the JCS."
"If Soviet forces attack into Iran by air or ground,
engage them in and over Iran. If Soviet forces attack
from Afghanistan, engage them in and over Afghanistan."
"Air action over and south of the Persian Gulf is
permitted in self-defense."
"Action to locate and destroy the Soviet fleet at sea
is permitted without restriction."
6 . The Bandar Abbas Lodgment
As prepared by the staff and approved by CINCIND,
Plan A called for the establishment of JTF 21, built
around the 21st Airborne Corps, for the seizure of a
lodgment at Bandar Abbas. At the end of the lodgment
phase, JTF 21 would be terminated.
Plan A also called for the seizure by the "^th MAF
of Chah Bahar as soon as amphibious shipping could be
moved into position following its use in securing the
beachhead at Bandar Abbas.
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The composition of JTF 21:
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combatants
Note 1 Not all these ARIND troops will be under JTF 21,
depending on the phase of the operation.
No t e 2 ; Not all these AFIND unites will be under JTF 21,
depending on the phase of the operation.
Note 3: The '^2d MAU (BLT reinf) and ath MAB (bde reinf)
a.rs the only USMC units that might be part of JTF 21
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Note A- ; Amphibious Squadron B (PHIBRON 2) is opcon to JTF
21 only for Phase I (seizure of Bandar Abbas); it then
reverts to NAVIND Qth Fleet control.
Note 5 : 8th Fleet (NAVIND) is made up of elements of
PACQM and LANTCQM , chopped to NAVIND, hence to USINDCOM.
Except for PHIBRON 2 (see Note ^), 8th Fleet units are not
part of JTF 21 but are "in support."
The 10th Air Force plan called for air
reconnaissance but no air attack before D-day, and for on-
call close air support to PHIBRON 2's assault of Bandar
Abbas on D-day, to be employed only in the event of serious
opposition. Likewise, the se 1 f -dep loyment of the "^Tth Air
Assault Division and the airborne assault of the 102d
Airborne Division were to be supported with on-cail air,
but only if opposing forces were identified in the ars^ by
intelligence or by pathfinders.
If such tactical air as the RIAF possessed should
attack U.S. forces, their bases in Iran would be taken out
and their air capability destroyed.
A major tactical air effort was held in readiness
for execution as required upon the first crossing of the
Iran-Afghanistan border by Soviet forces, whether air or
land. If Soviet air forces crossed the border, all air
bases in Afghanistan would be open to attack. If land
forces crossed the border, they would be attacked both in
Iran and in Afghanistan.
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The sequence of events which followed was:
1-3 June Soviet forces in Afghanistan prepare to move;
Soviet actions indicate an intention to
intervene in Iran.
^ June PHIBRON E, under JTF 21, seizes Bandar
(D-day) Abbas.
5 June Soviet forces cross Iran-Afghanistan border.
5-12 June 10th AF and Soviet air forces engage in air
warfare: air-to-air combat; attack of each
other's ground targets; action in and over
Iran and Afghanistan only.
6 June Sth MAB secures the port and beachhead.
7 June Elements of 21st COSCOM established at Bandar
Abbas; COSCDM buildup begins.
8 June Soviet 2'^'th CAA headquarters is operational
at Zahedan; units of 2'4th CAA are strung out
on road from Zahedan some 200 km north and
are moving south.
7 June '^7th Air Assault Division self-deploys into
(D+3) objective area ^0 km NE of Bandar Abbas,
prepares for movement to vicinity of Jiroft.
10 June 102d Airborne Division deployed by airborne
( D+6 ) and airlanding operations into its objective
area
.
12 June 230th Separate Armor Brigade begins arriving
at Bandar Abbas.
12 June Soviet 2'^th CAA dispositions are... ( TBD
)
13 June -^th MAP seizes Chah Bahar , established
beachhead; JTF 21 disestablished; CINCIND
orders Sth MAB to remain under 21st Airborne
Corps
.
11-1^ June Air warfare continues.
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The 21st Airborne Corps plan established a
lodgment area some 300 kilometers deep. It assigned the
A-7th Air Assault Division a 250 kilometer front facing the
24th CAA, and gave the rest of the lodgment ares. line to
the 102d Airborne Division, reinforced with corps
aviation.
Taking into account the virtually trackless
terrain highly unfavorable to mechanized forces in the
eastern two-thirds of its sector, the '^•7th Air Assault
Division plan assigned that sector to its 1st Brigade.
In the western third of its sector, one of the two
roads potentially useful to the enemy led into the corps
sector across the Jebal Barez to Sabsevaran and the other
road went northwest to Kerman thence south toward Bandar
Abbas. Here, the 47th Air Assault Division plan
visualized establishing a killing zone in the vicinity of
Darzin. ( Ref . 7, pp. WP1-WP4, WP7-WP13, WP15-UP17)
B. JILS MODEL
JTLS is a computer-based wargaming system. With such
a system, war fighting processes a.r e simulated, and the
users make decisions about the allocation of resources
assigned to accomplish a mission. The system also provides
assessments of the result of combat, based on Measures of
Effectiveness selected by the user ( s )
.
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JILS is designed so that it may be used, without
fnod i f icat ion , as a planning analysis tool, as supporting
material for education, and as a primary means to
investigate the results of combat.
The distinctions that set the Joint Theater Level
Simulation apart from almost all other wargaming models,
including the McClintic Theater Model, become obvious from
an examination of the total system as designed, developed,
and delivered. In addition to including explicitly defined
user requirements, the JTLS baseline design provides the
following benefits:
- The primary software language, SIMSCRIPT I 1. 5, was
designed for creating simulations.
- User-machine interaction permits inputs and outputs to
be available at independent terminals.
- A message-handling system and screen menuing
capabilities are provided to the user.
- An expandable memory capability allows increased data
base requirements to be accommodated.
- The design facilitates future product improvements.
- Configuration Management procedures provide for
ongoing visibility and control of software and
document at ion.
L. JTLS SYSTEM DESIGN
1 - Overview of Uarqaminq Phases
Wargaming may be conceptually divided into five
operationally sequenced phases: Initialization,
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Preparation, Execution, Restart, and Analysis. A brief
definition of each phase is provided.
- Initialization: those actions which must be
accomplished in advance in order to set the stage or
scenario for a wargame.
- Preparation: development of user-oriented items that
directly affect succeeding phases of the game.
- Execution: a phase to assess the effects of the
strategic and tactical plans developed in the two
previous phases. Interaction within the combat
simulation is accomplished by issuing orders to the
available military forces.
- Restart: the capability to reset and restart the
system following either a planned or an inadvertent
in terrup t ion
.
- Analysis: this phase provides insight into the issues
under study and allows the refinement of study
ob jec t i ves
.
a. Initialization
The wargaming operation commences with a
statement of specific objectives. Identifying these
objectives leads to the delineation of force lists,
weapons effects, geographical and political
considerations, logistical concerns, and threat analysis.
With the assistance of the Scenario Preparation Program
(SPP), these data are then entered into the JTLS data
base. Ihe SPP is designed to assist game planners in
three ai'eas-system i c data, environmental data, and
modeling parameters.
S3
- Systemic Data: includes military equipment, unit and
ordnance data such as descriptors of performance,
capabilities, and effectiveness relative to an
established baseline.
- Environmental Data: items that influence the
effectiveness of various t/^^r fighting systems (e.g.,
terrain, weather).
- Modeling Parameters: parameters or factors that
affect the performance of the mathematical equations,
or logical relationships that represent the real world
in which systemic or environmental data operate (e.g.,
attrition coefficients).
Following data entry, the SPP verifies that
individual entries in the data ar& within specified
ranges, alerts the user as to any that a.re not in range,
permits the user to change those entries, and then creates
the Scenario Initialization File and the Terrain Data File.
A second program, the Scenario Verification
Program ( SVP ) , may then be used to examine the
relationships between and among the items of data that
have been entered. This program produces a listing of all
noted errors, possible errors, and inconsistencies. The
SPP can then be used to correct the noted discrepancies and
the Sv'P to assess the new data. This process should
continue until all errors and inconsistencies are
eliminated. At that point, the SVP can be used to produce a
listing of the data base, formatted for readability for the
Contra 1 1 er ( s ) and for the Command, Air, Logistics, and
Intelligence players.
2^
Once the Scenario Initialization File and
Terrain Data File have been created, the wargame is ready
for use by the Contro 1 ler ( s ) and players,
b- Preparation
Following the development of a strategic
military mission to support stated objectives and issuance
of a mission statement for the forces by the Commander, the
component staff functions examine orders of battle,
situations, and courses of action; analyze courses of
action by opponents; and develop a concept of operations.
The concept of operations must encompass deployment,
employment, and sustainment.
Subsequently, specific tactical objectives ar&
derived from the formulation of campaign plans for
component forces (Air, Land, and Sea). Finally, selected
parameters may be modified to reflect constraints or
advantages created by the scenario. These plans and
modifications are accomplished by the Model Interface
Progr am
.
c . Execu t ion
During execution, campaign plans become
tasking orders as the capabilities of air, ground, and
naval forces are integrated into the battlefield scenario.
When forces move and become detected, combat will occur and
interactions dictate that the Commander's staff make day-
25
to-day battle management decisions. During the execution
phase, a continual assessment of decisions is essential to
maintain effective utilization of available resources.
Because JTLS is a machine-interactive, human-i n-the- loop
wargame, plans may be modified on a continuing basis.
d . Restar t
In the Restart phase, the wargame is
reinitiated following either a planned or a.n inadvertent
process interruption. The wargame is reinitialized at or
before the point of interruption. Reinitialization is
accomplished by the Executive Program.
2. JTLS PROGRftMS
The top-level program in the JTLS system is the
Executive program, which is actually a set of programs
written in DEC Command Language ( DCL ) and SIMSCRIPT I 1. 5.
It is designed to eliminate the requirement that the
Technical Coordinator be fluent in DCL and to automate as
many steps and validity checks as possible in beginning
the execution of the several JTLS programs. The Executive
program is menu-driven and is documented in the Technical
Coordinator Guide.
a. Technical Coordinator's Executive Program
A majority of the JTLS systems software is




( 1 ) Prepare or Alter a Scenario Data Base
Preparation and alteration of scenario
data bases and terrain data bases are accomplished with
the Scenario Preparation Program ( SPP ) . The interactive
support function for data entry provided by the SPP
assists the user in creating task organization and force
structure, weapon systems, environment, modeling
parameters, and checking that individual data items are
appropriate.
The SPP was created to be operated
independently of the main JTLS wargame. Since it may take
many weeks to build a major wargame scenario, depending on
the availability of data and the size of the support staff,
this design feature is extremely important. Software
independence permits using the SPP without all the
computer and human resources necessary to operate the full
JTLS game. Wargamers can also use the SPP to create and
change scenario data bases while others are running the
wargame
.
( 2 ) Verify an Existing Scenario
Verification of scenario and terrain data
base IS accomplished using the Scenario Verification
Program ( SVP ) , which is designed to verify the output from
the SPP. The SVP checks the relationships between
different data elements, while the SPP checks the validity
E7
of individual data entries. A listing of all errors and
discrepancies detected by the SVP is provided. The user
may then execute the SPP to make appropriate changes to the
data, based on this error listing. The process of
executing the SPP and SVP should be repeated until all
necessary changes have been entered in the data. The SVP
will also, as a user option, create Player Manuals for the
data base.
( 3) Print Out Player Manuals
A user can create Player Manuals for any
scenario by running the Scenario Verification Program and
requesting that the manuals be created. These manuals,
which are formatted for easy reading, a.r& useful for
reviewing the data during the preparation phase. They may
also be sued by the players during the execution of the
game as a source for starting condition data and unit
capab i 1 i t ies
.
( ^ ) Star t /Res tar t the Combat Events Program
The Technical Coordinator initially
starts the Combat Events Program (CEP) and, when
necessary, restarts the model following a planned or an
unplanned shutdown. The CEP is the warfare-simulation
model around which JTLS is developed. The modules
included in the CEP simulate the movement and interaction
of land, air, and sea forces for two-sided combat. The
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modules produce a realistic, real-time warfare
environment. This simulation model can be run faster than
real time; hence, if a minimum of player intervention is
required, the game speed can be set at a higher rate. Game
speed is controlled by setting the ratio of game time to
rea 1 t i me
.
( 5 ) Backup/Restore a Scenario
The Technical Coordinator is responsible
for saving the output from the execution of the CEP. If
executed, this portion of the Technical Coordinator's
Executive Program saves all data needed to perform post
game analysis or to restart the CEP.
< 6 ) Start the Graphics Processor
The JTLS graphics processor is started by
the Technical Coordinator via a separate terminal. The
JTLS graphics system provides a visual representation of
the battlefield and some of the events in the battle. The
background, provided from a laser disc, is in the format of
standard military maps. The game entity data are in the
form of standard military symbols. The graphics process
can execute only while the CEP is executing.
( 7 ) Run the Post-Processor
The Post-Processor can be run from the
Technical Coordinator's Executive Program if a data base
for the program has been created. The Post-Processor uses
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the commercial relational data base program INGRES for its
processing. More than one hundred preformatted queries are
available as part of Version 1.5 of JTLS . Analysts
familiar with INGRES can build other queries as required.
The Post-Processor can also be run from the Players'
Executive Program.
A new INGRES-formatted JTLS data base can
be created only from the PlayerOl (Controller) Model
Interface Program during game play. The Post-Processor
was designed to be used immediately after a checkpoints
before game execution resumes, thus providing a near real-
time analysis capability to the players, as well as in the
stand-alone mode described above.
(8) JTLS Tools Menu
This menu option brings the user to a
second menu, which permits execution of a series of
software utility type tools designed to permit the




Exit to the Operating System
This option permits the Technical
Coordinator to leave the Technical Coordinator's Executive
Program and access the operating system directly.
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b. Players' Executive Program
( 1 ) Run the Model Interface Program (NIP)
The Model Interface Program 15 an
interactive program used by all players to transmit their
decision (in the form of orders) to the JTLS Combat Events
Program. A player MIP provides continuous interaction
between the CEP and the player. The number of stations and
MIPs needed is a user variable and is dependent upon the
exercise or system application. A minimum of four
terminals (one each for the Red Commander, Blue Commander,
Controller, and Technical Coordinator) to a maximum of 28
(two for the Technical Coordinator and 26 players) may be
emp loyed
.
After one Controller and a Commander for
each side have been assigned, the remaining MIPs can be
assigned to any of the following functions:
Contr o 1 ler
(BLUE or RED)
Air &, Log i s t 1 cs
Air 2^ Intelligence
Logistics 2k Intelligence
Air, Logistics 2x Intelligence
Commander
Air
Log 1 st ics
Intel 1 i gence
31




- Communication between players and Controllers.
- Communication between players and the
simu 1 at ion
.
- Accessing and using support information.
- Saving directives in Archive Files.
- Analyzing Post-Processor Data.
- Controlling Graphics Output.
- Stopping or temporarily halting the game.
(2) Run the Post-Processor
combat
This option allows individual players to
run the Post-Processor in the stand-alone mode.
(3) Stand-Alone MIP
This option allows the individual player
to build directives, including orders, routes, weapon
loads, logistics loads, etc., while the game is not
executing. It is worth noting that the Stand-Alone MIR
cannot be started until the Scenario Initialization File
has been created. Even the Stand-Alone MIP needs the
Player Initialization Files to start itself.
3E
( A- ) Logout
This option permits the player to log off
the system, i.e., to terminate a session on the computer.
3. Future
The JTLS design provides for continued
improvements that will enhance the capabilities of the
system. These improvements include Naval Amphibious
modeling and simulation technology advances.
- Naval and Amphibious Module. The Naval and Amphibious
Module will provide the capability to model delivery of
forces to various combat environment, subsurface
warfare, and will enhance current naval modeling
capab i 1 i ty
.
- Simulation Technology Advances. JTLS may draw on data
base systems, distributed processing, and other





The air modules address those aspects of air
operations that were identified by the United States
Readiness Command, the United States Army War College, and
the Concepts Analysis Agency users as required
capabilities. An air tasking order ( ATO ) can be created
for the players to plan and schedule missions well in
advance of their desired launch and alert times. The ATO
permits the building of mission "packages" that are
composed of different types of aircraft, as well as
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directing individual, single-aircraft missions. A simple
example of a mission package is one attack aircraft and one
escort. A more complex grouping could consist of some
attack aircraft, Wild Weasel, fighter escorts, and
electronic countermeasure ( ECM ) aircraft. Using the
various air directives available through JTLS , all of which
are explained in detail in the JTLS Player Guide, the
following types of missions can be tasked:
- Airborne -Warning and Control System.
- Aerial Refueling.
- Combat Air Patrol.
- Defensive Counter Air (placed on alert at either home
base or from forward-operating location).
- Offensive Air Support (close air support).
- Escort
.
- Reconnaissance and Armed Reconnaissance.
- Electronic Combat.
- Air Interdiction and Offensive Counter Air.
- Air Defense Suppression (Wild Weasel).
- Air lift.
- Airdrop.
In addition to the mission capabilities enumerated
above, there are two additional capabilities (listed below)
that affect air operations:
- Accomplishment of airspace management.
3^
- Weapons load directives that provide load
configurations for various combat missions. These
configurations represent preferred conventional loads.
Modeling the air assets includes both the aircraft
and the weapons that they use. Aircraft a.re given mission
orders that describe details such as the routes to fly? the
type ot mission to perform, targets to strike, and when to
launch. For example, aircraft that are directed to perform
combat air patrol missions are assigned an orbit location
and will remain at that location until they must depart for
fuel or lack of weapons or the mission runs out of cre^
time. Airlift and airdrop missions are checked within the
model to determine the aircraft capacity needed for the
requested mission. Finally, the air module logic will
schedule the appropriate number of sorties.
Certain critical air weapon assets are also
explicitly modeled m the air model portion of the CEP.
Some air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons are loaded,
flown, and expended in detail. Ueapon characteristics
such as the pr obab i 1 i t y-of -k i 1 1 ( PK ) are used. The model




The ground commander is responsible for the
successful execution of the mission. The commander and
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staff develop a concept of operations and subsequently
execute deployment, employment, and sustainment strategies
and plans. To effect these plans, users have the following
capabilities at their disposal for the ground forces:
- Establish new routes for ground movement.
- Perform administrative moves.
- Attack.
- Defend.




- Order indirect fire support (and the associated
capability to cancel such orders).
- Emplace mines.
- Modify tactical thresho 1 ds- the point at which a unit
will change its posture (e.g., from attack to defend).
- Clear mines.
- Repair targets.
The ground module of the CEP performs the basic
ground combat functions of JTLS. Ground close combat is
modeled by use of mixed, heterogeneous, time-stepped
Lanchestrian difference equations. Ground movement follows
a path of hexagons, with the moving unit "jumping" from
hexagon to hexagon at appropriate time intervals. The
paths that ^re followed may either be minimum time or




A very large number of combat systems may be
represented. Each system is characterized in terms of
various characteristics, including maximum effective
range, lethality, recoverab i 1 i ty and repa irab i 1 i ty , type
of fuel and ammunition required, etc. Combat systems are
also characterized as direct or indirect fire systems,
with the appropriate differences in attrition
ca icu i a t i ons
.
Indirect fire may be employed explicitly and
implicitly in the Lanchestrian attrition. All munitions
are delivered to a set of coordinates on the terrain. All
units, supply convoys, and targets in the vicinity of the
fire are subject to attrition, regardless of who fired the
munitions. Any ground combat unit may be directed to
reinforce another ground combat unit with indirect fire
resources. Any unit may be ordered to lay or clear mines
and to repair targets.
3. NAVAL
Naval surface units have the ability to maneuver
and engage targets with naval gunfire. Aircraft carriers
may be included in a scenario. Carrier'=, have the ability
to simultaneously maneuver and conduct air operations.
The JTLS model is capable of representing ship-to-shore,
ship-to-ship, and anti-air warfare. Although the current
naval modeling capability is limited, future planned
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enhancements for the naval modules include the simulation
of subsurface and amphibious \Aiarfar& and a more detailed
modeling of naval surface operations.
^. LOGISTICS
The Commander's concept of the operation must
consider a variety of combat support and combat service
support activities. In addition to ground and air
tactical plans, activities involving force sustainment aire
essential to mission accomplishment. The following
logistics capabilities exist in JTLS:
- Cross-leveling of supplies between two units.
- Resupply of units.
- Creation of supply reserves (stockpiles).
- Creation of logistics loads for use in future orders.
- Modification of reorder thresholds for one or more
categories o,f supplies for either a single unit, a
group of units, or all units.
- Change of the depot or support unit from which a unit
orders its supplies.
- Modification of stockage objectives for one or more
categories of supplies for either a single unit, group
of units, or all units.
- Airlift Operations (through the Air Model)—an
aircraft squadron or helicopter company is capable of
lifting either a unit or supply load from a loading
location to an off-loading location.
- Airdrop Operations (through the Air Model)— an
aircraft squadron or helicopter company is capable of
airdropping a unit or supply load at a specified
location or alternate location.
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The foregoing list indicated the wide range of
capabilities that a.re designed into the logistics module.
As such JTLS provides a great deal of flexibility in
addressing logistics requirements and problems. At one
extreme* modeling zero consumption permits assessments of
non- 1 og 1 st i cs-re 1 ated results without the computer
processing burden of the consumption calculations. The use
of the unlimited supply capability permits assessment of
both the logistics and combat results in an environment
totally unconstrained by the availability of supplies. if
desired, Red and Blue logistics may be gamed
asymmetrically, so that the gamer may choose simulation of
different logistic doctrines. At the other extreme, the
very specific DIRECTED RESUPPLY, AIRLIFT, AIRDROP, SEALIFT,
REORDER LEVEL, and STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE directives permit
high-resolution m i cromanagment of the logistics situation.
Between these two extreme conditions, modeling the normal
constrained availability, automatic requisitioning, and
automatic ( p 1 ayer - i n i t i ated ) PUSH shipments provides a
med ium- 1 evel , management-by-exception capability.
A very large number of different categories of
supply can be represented. Categories of supply need not
correspond to the standard military classes of supply. One
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This list is only an example. More or fewer categories of
supplies may be used. It must be noted again that a major
advantage of JTLS is that it is a data-driven model; the
user is free to define into the data base whatever is
desired with respect to the data, e.g., the supply classes
and categories that are to be used.
Supplies Are consumed in JTLS much as they are in
real life. A data base input variable determines the
normal periodic consumption rate for each category of
supply by unit. In addition to this "normal" consumption,
units that are in combat and/or moving will consume
supplies at higher rates. Explicit expenditure of supplies
occurs in JTLS by events such as ground or naval indirect
Tire missions, destroyed convoys, depots that have been
^0
attacked, air movement (airlift and airdrop), and air
engagements
.
The logistics module includes a maintenance
function that simulates the repair of systems damaged in
combat and their eventual return to operational status.
Each combat system can have identifying attributes placed
in the data base, which will indicate a percentage of
casualties that can be recovered from combat and a
percentage of those that will eventually return to their
combat unit. This method is used to represent recovery
and repair times of various combat systems. One aspect of
this modeling approach is its extensible nature. For
example, medical facilities a.re not normally included as a
combat system. If there were a need to study the
capability of a medical unit to function in a particular
scenario, then be adding the appropriate data to the data
base, such an excursion would be possible without changing
the logic of the model itself.
5. INTELLIGENCE
The Commander and staff must possess information
relative to their enemy in order to execute the military
mission with adequate and timely tactical plans. JTLS
provides the user with one capability pertaining to the
effects of intelligence collection, namely Human
Intelligence (HUMINT). Players are able to manage HUMINT
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teams by relocating them and changing the amounts of time
that they spend on reconnaissance missions. Additional
intelligence source material may be ascertained through
variously available intelligence reports such as Situation
Reports (SITREPs) and National, Strategic, and Tactical
Intelligence Summaries-
6. REPORTS AND QUERIES
The capability to obtain information, either
through periodically disseminated reports or responses to
player queries, is essential to the successful planning
and decision-making process. JTLS provides the user with
a wide variety of reports and queries that enable him to
stay abreast of the situation. These are incorporated into
the four generic groups: Command (Ground and Naval), Air,
Logistics, and Intelligence.
a. Command (Ground and Naval).
- Situation Report (SITREP): allows a player to request
a current situation report for any unit or group of
units in that player's reference data base.
- Operational Summary ( OPSUM ) : provides the Commander




- Air Status: provides a status summary of a squadron
and the missions currently being flown.
- Route Status: provides a list of all air routes that
have been developed.
- Load Information: provides a display of all
pi^eplanned weapon loads.
^2
c - Log i st ics
- Logistics Report: available upon request for a
particular force or a specific unit.
- Spread Sheet: provides summarized logistic statistics
for elements on a side, using a tabular format.
d. Intelligence.
- National Intelligence: the Commander is provided with
regularly scheduled National Intelligence Summaries.
- Strategic Intelligence: the Commander is provided
with regularly scheduled Strategic Intelligence
Summar i es
.
- Target Summary: provides the Commander with a current
target list.
- Tactical Intelligence Summary: provides the Commander
with limited information on unit names, activities, and
location of hostile units and the identification,
location, and capability of hostile and neutral targets
within a specified range of friendly ground units.
- HUMINT Team Status: provides information on HUMINT
teams that are currently collecting intelligence.
7. TERRftIN REPRESENTATION
The movement of forces within any combat
environment is affected by the representation of the
terrain. JTLS includes a data base that represents the
geographic region of the planned scenario. The terrain is
stored in the computer as sets of data points that
describe a hexagonal "box" of terrain. Each hexagon in the
data base is described in terms of its relative geographic
location, the terrain interior to the hexagon boundaries,
altitude, and the barriers on each of its sides. The size
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of the hexagons in the initial JTLS data base is
approximately 16 kilometers from side to side. The number
of hexagons used in any given data base and their size are
user data entries.
JTLS uses the terrain values, interior and barrier,
to determine how units proceed during the wargame. The
interior values that represent desert, swamps, etc., a.re
used to calculate the time or movement across that
hexagonal area.. Barrier values are similar but may also
represent impassable or repairable obstacles such as
destroyed bridges. In this situation the player (or model,
in some instances) must decide to either expend the
necessary resources and time to repair the obstacle or
calculate a new route around it. The terrain values are
also used to identify shorelines so that ground and naval
units can be restricted to their appropriate parts of the
world. In addition, the elevation values are used to
determine if helicopters can traverse a given hexagon,
a. CONTROLLER
A JTLS game may be executed with as few as four
terminals, as many as 28 terminals, or any intermediate
number of terminals. In any of the configurations, at
least one of the terminals is designated as a game
Controller terminal. Data management functions are
^^
performed at this station- The control function permits
the individual to do the following activities:
- Data base modification. At any time in the life of
the game, the Controller has access and may alter the
game data base.
- Game speed control. The control terminal is used to
set and change the speed of the game.
- Post-Processor initiation. One of the Controllers can
initiate the Post-Processor during a game pause. This
Controller is called the Primary Controller, and is
always designated as Player 1.
The primary purpose of the control function is to
provide a single point for data base and game speed
manipulations. This capability frees the players to
concentrate on the strategies and tactics within the
scenario itself, and they are relieved of administrative
problems. A secondary purpose is to provide a focus for
the Technical Coordinator to maintain control of the game
progress and modulate the play as required through data
base manipulations.
9. lECHNICAL COORDINATOR
The JTLS Technical Coordinator ( TC ) function is a
role nominally staffed by someone who is well versed in
operating the computer system used for the wargame. It is
the TC who has the responsibility of determining that the
system is performing properly. The TC starts the
simulation, establishing the proper file structure, saving
the necessary history files, and generally determining that
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the system is responding normally. He also decides whether
output will be produced for the Post -Processor and assigns
graphics stations to players. The TC usually represents,
or is a member of, the computer operations or programming
staff of the organization that is responsible for the
computer system being used for the simulation. ( Ref . 6, pp.
5.1-5.2, 3.1-3.1^, ^.1-^.15)
E. STATISTICAL DESIGN
The specific goal for this experiment was to test the
following two hypotheses:
- An operational plan ( DPLAN ) with multiple options or
alternatives is superior to an DPLAN with a single
option or alternative. That is, multiple option
planning is better than single option planning.
- The value of a multiple option OPLAN over a single
option OPLAN will increase as the pace, workload, or
stress of battle increases. The degree to which
multiple-option planning is better than single-option
planning is positively related to the pace, workload,
or stress of battle, and to the value of time lost
during a battle due to the need to replan.
The overall experimental design was a two-factorial
w 1 th 1 n-sub jec t s analysis of variance. The two independent
variables were:
- PI ann i nq , which manipulates the number of options or
contingency plans within art OPLAN. There ar b two
level s
:
1. Single-Option Planning is defined as an OPLAN that
has one primary hypothesis of enemy intent, one
primary course of action, and one primary estimate
of battle outcome.
^6
Multiple-Option Planning is defined as an OPLAN
that has alternative hypotheses of enemy intent,
alternative courses of action, and alternative




different attributes that affect
workload, or stress. The four
this factor ars: the number
Orange lands in Blue's rear; the
a composite of four
time pressure, mental
attributes comprising
of air assaults that
fighting strength of
Orange's air-lifted units; the speed of advance of Blue
and Orange's forces; and the frequency and Bocu.ra.cy of
intelligence reports. There are two levels:
1. Low Battle Workload is defined as two Orange air
assault units to Blue's rear (and two to the
front); a fighting strength equal to 600-650 troops
and supplies for each of Orange's airlifted units;
a speed of advance of 120 km per day; and one
report per each simulated hour from National
Technical and Theater Strategic Intelligence with
100 percent accuracy.
2. High Battle Workload is defined as four Orange air
assault units to Blue's rear; a fighting strength
equal to 1200-1300 troops and supplies for each of
Orange's airlifted units; a speed of advance of 160
km per day; and one report per each four simulated
hours from National and Theater Strategic
Intelligence with 60 percent accuracy.
"Ihe resulting design was therefore a 2x2, yielding four
treatment conditions. Each team was assigned to one
counterbalanced ordering of the four conditions.
Counterbalancing of the treatment conditions would help in
reducing learning and order effects. (See Figures 2-1
through 2-*^ . )
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Figure S-A-. Experimental Design
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1 . Experimental Variables
Sometimes an experimental design requires a
variable or set of variables to create or enhance the
experimental milieu. Such variables are often referred to
as random situation factors or experimental variables, and
do not figure into the statistical analyses. The location
and pattern of the Orange air assaults were two such
variables. To disguise the multiple appearances of the
same manipulation, as well as to foster external validity
(applicability to the real world), the exact location of
each of Orange's air assaults was varied. Different but
comparable units in Blue's rear were attacked. Moreover,
the exact look or pattern was also varied so that it
sometimes appeared as one big air assault and at other
times appeared as two separate air assaults. Another
variable was the exact nature of the SITREPS that each
headquarters receives at the beginning of an experimental
trial. Once again, the SITREPS were varied to mask
multiple appearances of the same experimental manipulation.
It was also necessary to inject some variation
into the Orange scenario (i.e., script). These variations
were necessary to respond to Blue's moves, establish Orange
as an intelligent responsive adversary, and make the




In addition to the independent and experimental
variables, there were a number of experimental constants.
These were parameters that were not manipulated but
instead were fixed at some value. Some of the important
experimental constants were:
- size, geographic location, and terrain of the battle
zone: a 300 x 300 mile a.rea in Iran encompassing
deserts and mountains;
- Blue's force size and compliment;
- initial starting positions for Blue and Orange;
- primary mission: both Blue and Orange will be directed
by their own unchanging primary mission;
- unsolicited intelligence (i.e., that Blue will receive
and Grange order) will be set at a 10 percent
probability.
- number of HUMINT Teams for Blue will be fixed at 36,
once placed will move at 90 km per day, and report at
an interval of one report every three hours of
s imu 1 ated t ime
;
- threshold factors, i.e., the level of strength at
which a unit changes posture (e.g., attack to defend,
defend to delay, etc.)
- weather: good weather will be assumed throughout the
entire length of the simulated times; and
- length of simulation: three hours.
3. Blue Task
The Blue team's task in all experimental
treatments was to hold its assigned position (i.e., line
Bastogne), trap, and annihilate a sizable enemy contingent
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outside Bam. It was also expected that Blue would thwart
all enemy advances or attacks, set and accomplish subgoals
to attain primary mission, accomplish goals with minimum
self -at tr i t ion and maximum efficiency in the employment of
communications, supplies, and troops.
^ . Ulor k 1 pad
The cognitive workload imposed by the experimental
treatments, as well as other conditions throughout a trial,
was expected to affect the subject's and team's
performance. Workload was a construct employed to explain
the inability of a human operator to copy with the
performance requirements of a task. The literature
described three approaches to the measurement of workload:
- Measures of demand, expressed in terms of the
objective parameters of the task (e.g., signal
quality and information rate).
- Measures of response (either behavioral or
physio logical ) .
- The performer's subjective appraisals of the load
experienced during the task.
The third approach was employed in this
experiment. To assess subjective workload, each subject
filled out the Subjective Workload Evaluation Assessment
1 oo 1 (SWEAT) once every half hour (plus or minus 5
minutes). SWEAT is a pencil and paper questionnaire that
asks the subjects to evaluate the time pressure, mental
effort, and stress they experienced during the past work
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period. Subjects make their ratings on a five-point
scale, and it usually requires less than 30 seconds to
complete the SWEAT measure. SWEAT was used by ALPHATECH
on an earlier contract, and at that time, the measured
reliability of the instrument (coefficient) was 0.90,
indicating very high reliability. Scores on the measure
also produced significant main effects and interactions
indicating predictive validity-
Using SWEAT provided a validity check on the
Battle Workload manipulations. The instrument was also
used to track workload throughout an experimental trial,
establish the perceived workload for each headquarters,
assess perceived workload for each individual within a
headquarters, and to reorder the experimental trials to
reflect high or low perceived workload.
5 . Dependent Measures
A number of dependent variables were assessed.
1 he JTLS simulator produced "checkpoint" data. At any
time, JTLS can be requested to output checkpoint data that
indicates the latitude and longitude of each element (Blue
and Orange) and the current value of each of 12 attributes
describing a unit's fighting strength. These data were
used to formulate three primary measures of effectiveness
( MUE ) . The first MOE was based on Blue's Forward Line of
Troops ( FLOT ) . Blue's final FLDT was compared to its
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initial PLOT and the amount of advance or withdrawal
calculated. The second MOE was the exchange ratio, i.e.,
Orange's attrition relative to Blue's attrition. The third
MUE examined the percentage of Grange troops behind Blue's
lines at the end of the game.
Just prior to each experimental trial, subjects
were presented with an DPLAN . The OPLAN gave a brief
description of the expected outcomes of the plan or plans.
Subjects (or headquarters) were asked to examine the
expected outcomes and then write their own version, based
on their knowledge of the plan and situation. At the
game's conclusion, a comparison was made between the
initial expected outcome and the final disposition. This
provided another MOE that related goals expected to goals
ach i eved
.
The JTLS simulator also records a time history of
about 70 critical events (e.g., time an airlift began,
time an airlift was concluded, time a ground-to-air
missile was launched, time maintenance was scheduled, time
maintenance was completed, time a logistic request was
made, time a logistic request was responded to). A number
of process and efficiency measures were constructed from
these data, reflecting team performance.
In addition to these observational measures,
information was collected and analyzed on the decision
5^
processes that occurred throughout the game. These
measures allowed the assessment of how single- or multiple-
option OPLANS and battle workload levels contributed to a
team's meeting or not meeting its goals during a game.
Two major types of measures were planned: 1
)
measures of the speed with which a team took effective
action in response to actions by Orange, and 2) measures
of the number and quality of the hypotheses that were
generated about the enemy's situation, objectives and
possible actions. These measures were based on the HEAT
data collection approach, but they concentrated on the
subset of discussions and decisions that a.r& most relevant
to the hypotheses being tested in the experiment.
These measures were based on data collected by the
observers who were assigned to each C^ ' cell throughout the
game. The observers had two types of observation sheets:
a sheet for recording the actions taken by the Blue team,
and a sheet for recording the team's hypotheses about the
enemy's situation and possible actions.
The ACTION TAKEN observation sheet records the
time of each action taken by a Blue team, and the nature
of the action. Possible action types include probes for
information, requests for assistance, and direct actions
such as the movement of forces. For direct actions, the
observer recorded his judgment of the effectiveness
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(quality) of the action on a five-point scale, based on his
knowledge of ground truth and his knowledge of the Orange
scr ip t .
The ACTIONS TAKEN sheet also records the time at
which the Blue team first became aware of each Orange
action, and the type of Orange action. This is necessary
because of the variable lag (from to 12 minutes) between
the time that an action is taken by Orange, and the time it
appears on the screen of the Blue team. The measure will
compute the lag between the time that Blue becomes aware of
Bn Orange action, and the time that an ef fec t i ve action is
taken m response. The observer's evaluation of the
effectiveness of the action was crucial. The aim was not
simply to take some type of action quickly, but to take an
effective action quickly. The hypothesis was that a
multiple-option OPLAN would help a team to take effective
action more quickly in response to an enemy action,
especially under conditions of high workload.
The DISCUSSION OF UNCERTAINTIES observation sheet
records the hypothesis generation that lies behind the
actions taken by the Blue team. The sheet records two
types of hypotheses: 1) speculations about where the
enemy is currently located, strength and type of units,
and 2) speculations about what the enemy may do in the
future, based on possible objectives.
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The Blue team had some information about the
location and strength of Orange, but it was incomplete,
and may have been supplemented by hypotheses. The
observer recorded the hypotheses that were discussed, the
time of the discussion, and the accuracy of the
hypotheses. Because the observers had access to ground
truth in the game, they knew whether Blue's speculations
about the current enemy situation at any time were
correc t
.
The Blue team may also have been expected to
discuss the enemy's possible objectives and future
actions. Again, the observer recorded the hypotheses
discussed, the time of the discussion, and the accuracy of
the hypotheses. Because the observers had access to the
script being used by Orange, they were able to evaluate the
accuracy of Blue's hypotheses.
The observer's record of the time of each
hypothesis was used to link the discussions of uncertainty
to the actions taken. For example, a discussion of
possible enemy locations might lead to the decision to send
an HUMIMT team to a location to collect definite
information. Discussion of possible enemy courses of
action might lead to decisions about the allocation of Blue
f o t- c e s .
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Discussion of uncertainty was strongly linked to
the used of single- and multiple-option QPLANS in the
experiment. The team using the multiple-option plan
already had several alternative hypotheses about enemy
intent laid out in the plan. The team may or may not have
chosen to further elaborate these hypotheses. The team
with the single-option plan may have chosen to generate
some alternative hypotheses, which may or may not have
agreed with those provided to the multiple-option team.
Data from the DISCUSSION OF UNCERTAINTIES sheet allowed the
assessment of the extent to which a multiple-option plan
either facilitated the team's discussion of uncertainty or
reduced their need to discuss uncertainties during the
battle. For example, it was possible that under low stress
conditions, a team with a single-option plan would have
enough time to generate and evaluate hypotheses, and come
up with a flexible, effective course of action, while under
high-stress conditions they would not. ( Ref . 8, pp. 5-L7)
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III. ANALYSIS
The design of the experiment was a two way, within
subjects, factorial. The factors were Planning (two
levels) and Battle Workload (two levels). Factorial
experiments yield more complete information than single-
factor designs because they permit observation of the
interaction effects created by the combination of
variables. Such effects are above and beyond those which
can be predicted from each variable observed alone.
Moreover, the results of a factorial experiment are more
practically useful because the estimates of the effects
are obtained by averaging over a relatively broad range of
other relevant experimental variables. A within subjects
design was used to make maximum use of the available teams,
and to allow each team to serve as its own contrast.
The statistical analysis was a multivariate analysis
of variance, employing the SPSS software package. The
multivariate approach was less sensitive to failure to
meet the assumptions of the analysis of variance, and thus
provided a more robust analysis.
Care was taken to counterbalance experiment conditions
and experimental variables. However, a vulnerable point in
the design was the assignment of each team to an ordering
where a multiple DPLAN condition is followed by a single
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OPLAN condition. Concern that teams might apply the
multiple options from the previous trial when faced with
similar situations under a single option OPLAN was
countered by introducing variations in experimental
variables to disguise the basic similarity of the trial
scenarios. ( Ref . S, pp. 21-22)
Several hypotheses used to form a basis for the trial
observations were:
- Humans have limited information processing capacity.
- Humans tend to narrow their consideration of
alternatives in high stress situations.
- Humans tend to rationalize following a decision.
- Humans tend to disbelieve information which is
inconsistent with strong prior behavioral commitments
and will seek out information to confirm the threatened
V i ew
.
- There tends to be disproportionate amounts of
communication directed toward an opinion deviate in a
sma 1 1 group
.
- Humans are more effective in all-channel communication
networks when trying to solve a complex problem and
more effective in a hierarchial net when trying to
solve a less complex problem.
"The order of play was as follows:
GAME 1 GAME 2 GAME 3 GAME ^
TEAM A
PLAN SINGLE MULTIPLE MULTIPLE SINGLE
UGRKLGAD HIGH HIGH LOW LOW
TEAM B
PLAN SINGLE MULTIPLE MULTIPLE SINGLE
WORKLOAD LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
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1 he measurement of command and control effectiveness
in the experiment had two components: the outcomes of the
lAiargame and the process by which those outcomes were
achieved. Outcome measures indicate the degree to which
the Blue teams in the experiment achieved their objectives
in the game; process measures provide more detail on how
they went about achieving those goals.
Outcome measures were determined by the goals that
were set for the Blue team at the beginning of the game.
These goals were to defend the Line Bastogne and to prevent
any significant enemy penetration of the Line. This was to
be achieved with the minimum attrition of Blue forces.
Achievement of these goals was measured through two major
factors: movement and troop losses. The JTLS program
provided location and strenth data for all units at the
beginning and the end of the game, as well as periodic
reports, which might be used to compute outcome measures.




















Average Time Elapsed (in Minutes) Before First
Definitive Action After Enemy Air Assault (From
Obser vat i ons
)
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WORKLOAD WORKLOAD WORKLOAD WORKLOAD
SINGLE MULTIPLE MULTIPLE SINGLE
OPTION OPTIONS OPTIONS OPTION
15.0 6.0 3.0 3.0
ACTION: ACTION: ACTION: ACTION:




LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
WORKLOAD WORKLOAD WORKLOAD WORKLOAD
SINGLE MULTIPLE MULTIPLE SINGLE
OPTION OPTIONS OPTIONS OPTION
16.3 21 .5 1 1 .0 5.0
ACTION: ACTION: ACTION: ACTION:
ATTACK HELOS ATTACK HELOS ATTACK MOVE
AIR LIFT HELOS TROOPS
MOVE TROOPS
Figure 3-2. Average Time Elapsed (in Minutes) Before First
Definitive Action After Enemy Air Assault (From
















Figure 3-3. Average Subjective Workload Score During Period




































Figure 3-5. End-of-Game Effectiveness Measure: Computed As
A Function of Planned Versus Actual Enemy
Advance, Weighted by Enemy Attrition
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Figures 3-6 and 3-7 show a pattern of increasing
subjective workload as the game progressed for the
multiple-option conditions, and decreasing or constant
perceived workload for the single-option conditions. This
result is puzzling, and suggests that the presence of the
multiple-option plan may have had effects on perceived
workload that go beyond the effort associated with early
reactions to the air assault. Perhaps the multiple-option
plan allowed subjects to deal with the early air attack
without high stress or high workload, and they were
therefore able to increase their effort level or workload
































Figure 3-7. Subjective Workload (Low Stress)
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The outcome measures used in the experiment do not
reveal an increase in Blue effectiveness during the last
part ot the game under a multiple-option plan. However,
Blue troop losses increased during the last part of the
game under the multiple-option, while decreasing under the
single-option plan. This suggests that the players using
the multiple-option plan may have been taking more
aggressive action toward the end of the game, and the
outcome measures may not be sensitive enough to detect the
effects of this action. (Figure 3-8 through
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Figure 3-11. Total Troop Losses Over Time (H.W./S.O.)
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Players rated their subjective workload during the
experiment. Every 30 minutes, each player was asked to
complete a Subjective Workload Evaluation Assessment Tool
(SWEAT) questionnaire. This was a brief questionnaire
that asked subjects to make three ratings on a five-point
scale to evaluate the stress, mental effort, and time
pressure they had experienced during the previous half































OBSERVATION PERIOD (30 minute intervals)
Figure 3-13. Subjective
(H.W. /S.O.





























OBSERVATION PERIOD (30 minute intervals)
Figure 3-15. Subjective Workload Evaluation Assessment
( H. W. /M.O.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND OBSERVATIONS
The positive results of the experiment should not be
overshadowed by individually evaluating the preliminary
goals. I he unique attempt of the experiment was the
repetitive use of a model that provided the opportunity
for insight into the relative merits of alternative
courses of action, force structures, and procedures during
joint force combat operations. The lessons learned show
some minor drawbacks to repetition but they are things that
can be overcome by modifying the experimental design
execution. The repetitive use of JTLS or any other game,
like the current experiment utilizing JANUS, is helpful in
identifying trends during execution. The specific outcome
is not the purpose. ( Ref . 9, p. 95) CINC's will not
exercise in the manner of this experiment. They play only
one game. The designs, architectures, etc. learned from
these analytical series of experiments provide plausible
scenar los
.
Several lessons were learned from this experiment.
- Outcome measures are dependent on the characteristics
of the software used for the simulation.
- Limits on game time may lead to artificial behavior.
- Formal training of observers is essential.
- Subjects may act to keep their overall subjective
workload constant.
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- strong learning effects should be expected with game
repet i t ions
.
Observed features in the JTLS model include:
- The terrain over which the battle was conducted is
overlayed with hexagons (hex). The model prohibits a
Blue Force and Orange Force from occupying the same
hex, regardless of unit size.
- The attrition of fixed wing air missions was reported
to be stochastic. It was noted that Blue air, which
was extensively used, suffered high losses. Orange air
was seldom used and suffered only one loss. This
suggests the need for in-depth investigation into the
underlying game mechanism and the statistical analysis
ot game data to verify the stochastic nature of
attrition.
The direction this experiment had at the beginning was to
meet certain needs.
- Provide a quantitative framework to describe the
operation of real headquarters.
- Provide analytical tools for use in that framework to
go from data to design.
- Provide empirical tools to collect data in a form
consistent with the framework.
- Provide opportunities to apply those tools to gather
operational data.
I he goals established for this experiment were:
- For operational commands:
* a method for extracting more insight from exercises
* a method to identify trends through a series of
ey-src i ses
* develop more effective deployed headquarters
arch 1 tec tures
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- For systems commands:
* a tool to objectively and accurately assess program
a 1 ternat i ves
* a tool to verify and validate headquarters
performance
- For systems engineers:
* high level guidelines for better headquarters design
- For design guidance:
* establish some general design principles
* provide historical data for comparison
«• provide analytical tool for sensitivity analysis
- For data collection:
* provide a well structured set of measures to guide
data collection




* provide a unified framework for the study of command
and control
- provide specific theoretical and analytical results
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Multiple-option planning does appear to have some
effect on headquarters effectiveness. However, the
effects were limited in scope. When effectiveness is
measured by the success of the Orange enemy in meeting its
goals, the first major hypothesis of the experiment is
confirmed: Headquarters effectiveness was higher when a
multiple-option plan was used. The expected interaction
was not observed, however. The difference between single-
and multiple-option planning was not affected by workload
as implemented in this experiment. It is possible that the
differences induced by the low and high workload
manipulations in the experiment were not great enough to
create the expected interaction between the plans and
workload. Such an interaction might be observed under
higher workload conditions.
A more focused analysis of the outcome of the r^ar
a.rea battle also showed an effect of multiple-option
planning. The Blue team was most effective in the rear
area conflict, as measured by troop exchange ratios, under
a inu 1 t i p 1 e—op t 1 on plan and low-workload conditions. This
conclusion applies only to the rear area battle, however.
There were no differences in the overall exchange ratio by
experimental condition.
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Multiple-option planning had several different effects
on the processes that went on within each headquarters
during the experiment. The presence of a multiple-option
led to a better reaction to the enemy air assault under
conditions of low workload. The multiple-option plan also
led to lower subjective workload assessments immediately
following the assault. Commanders were less certain about
enemy intent at the beginning of the game if they were
given a multiple-option plan, and division headquarters
seems to have pursued a more active role, as measured by
their delay in reading their electronic mail. The higher
workload in division headquarters under a multiple-option
plan is supported by the analysis of subjective workload
throughout the experiment. As the game progressed, players
in the multiple-option plan condition showed an increase
in their subjective workload, while players in the single-
option condition did not.
Overall, the multiple-option plan seems to have
resulted in a better reaction to the air assault, at a
lower cost in terms of workload early in the game.
Players became more active later in the game when they had
a multiple-option plan, and showed more active
communications with division headquarters.
A correlation analysis suggests that the two
independent variables in the experiment, planning and
ao
workload, affected headquarters processes during the
experiment, and that these processes, xn turn, affected
wargame outcomes. Both plans and externally imposed
workload were correlated with end-of-game effectiveness in
the expected direction. The presence of a multiple-option
plan had a substantial positive correlation with rear
exchange ratios (.71) and with end-of-game effectiveness.
(.80) The correlation patterns suggest that both
subjective workload and false certainty about enemy intent
may have mediated the effects of planning on
effectiveness. The multiple-option plan led to a lower
workload following the assault, but to less certainty
about the enemy's objectives. Both of these factors may
have contributed to higher effectiveness.
Externally imposed workload was negatively related to
end-of-game effectiveness (-.55). The major mediating
tactors identified for this relationship ars
communications volume and false certainty about intent.
Higher workload conditions were associated with more
communication, which was negatively related to end-of-
game effectiveness. External workload was also positively
related to certainty, which had a negative relationship to
effectiveness measures.
The results of the experiment support the hypothesis
that multiple-option planning has a positive effect on
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headquarters effectiveness. Blue teams performed better
in frustrating enemy objectives when they were provided
with a multiple-option plan. The interaction expected
between planning and workload was not observed, however.
The positive effect of multiple-option planning on overall
outcomes was about equal under conditions of low and high
wor k 1 oad
.
Planning had several interesting effects on the
headquarters processes observed during the experiment.
First, the presence of multiple-option plan for dealing
with an enemy air assault led to a lower subjective
workload in the period immediately following the assault,
and subjective workload had a negative relationship to
outcomes. The multiple-option plan also seems to have
made commanders less certain about the enemy's intent.
Perhaps it introduced an element of doubt into their minds
about possible enemy actions. This uncertainty had a
positive effect on the outcomes of the battle. These
findings suggest a multiple-option plan may improve
effectiveness by decreasing workload, and by discouraging
a false sense of certainty about what the enemy will do.
Exper 1 men t a 1 1 y- 1 nduced workload was negatively related to
overall effectiveness, as expected. One of the effects of
higher workload was to increase communications volume,
which had a negative relationship to outcome measures.
8S
1 he Joint C3 simulator project will address the future
simulator needs of individual services and the future
simulator needs when performing joint operations. The
simulator will be made up of geographically dispersed,
interconnected command centers. It will provide the means
to experiment with and test the functioning of total
systems
.
The use of JTLS as a tool for repetitive use in
evaluating headquarters effectiveness has a promising
future. A government contractor is currently conducting
extensive improvements to the JTLS software to "fix" some
of the problems discovered during previous play. The
"game" provides a great deal of data to be used by
HEAT/WHITE. Better game preparation by subjects is highly
recommended. This would remove the learning curve on "game
play" and allow the subjects attention to be fully devoted
to option planning and headquarters "play".
The results of the experiment suggest two promising
paths for future work. First, it seems possible to
establish links between measures of headquarters processes
and measures of headquarters effectiveness that ^r ^ based
on battle outcomes. The two outcome measures used in the
experiment were highly correlated with each other,
suppot"ting the idea that both ^r e related to an underlying
concept of effectiveness. Meaningful correlations were
33
observed between process measures and outcome measures,
especially subjective workload and false certainty about
enemy intent. ( Ref . 10, pp. 17, 29-30, 3^-35, S-^-SS)
8^
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